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THE SCARLET GENE: BEHAVIORAL
GENETICS, CRIMINAL LAW, AND
RACIAL AND ETHNIC STIGMA
KAREN ROTHENBERG* AND ALICE WANG**
I
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a scientist from the state university asks you and your family to
participate in a study on a particular gene variant associated with alcoholism.
The project focuses on your ethnic group, the Tracy Islanders, who have a
higher incidence of alcoholism, as well as a higher incidence of the gene variant,
than the general population. You will not be informed whether you have the
gene variant, but your participation in the study might help scientists develop
drugs to help individuals control their addiction to alcohol. You have a family
history of alcoholism, and you are concerned that your twenty-one-year-old son
may be susceptible to the condition as well. Do you agree to participate in the
study?
Now imagine that, with your participation, the study concludes that Tracy
Islanders with the particular gene variant have a ten percent chance of
becoming alcoholics, whereas Tracy Islanders without the gene variant have
only a five percent chance. Although the scientists are careful to note that the
gene variant exists in the general population and is not “the cause” of
alcoholism, the sound-bite reported by the media is that Tracy Islanders are
hardwired to become alcoholics.
That same day, your son gets drunk at a bar and pushes an off-duty police
officer through a window, killing him. Your son is charged with murder, and his
lawyer wants to use his genetic predisposition toward alcoholism as a defense.
Some members of your family and community are concerned that this approach
will only further stigmatize Tracy Islanders as alcoholics. How do you advise
your son and his lawyer?
These scenarios were presented to a panel of scientists, legal experts,
journalists, and community leaders in a recent PBS television program entitled
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Genes on Trial: Genetics, Behavior, and the Law.1 This article uses the
television program as a framework for exploring the implications of behavioral
genetics research for the individual, family, community, and society. In
particular, it focuses on the unique potential for behavioral genetics research,
when placed in the context of criminal law, to stigmatize racial and ethnic
minority groups through the blame-shifting mechanisms of genetic reductionism
and genetic determinism. Like the scarlet “A” in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s
famous novel,2 DNA associated with criminal or antisocial behavior might
become a “scarlet gene” that marks the individual, his family, and his racial or
ethnic community as “flawed, compromised, and somehow less than fully
human.”3
This article proceeds in six parts. The remainder of Part I summarizes the
Genes on Trial program and introduces the issues raised by it. Part II explains
why behavioral genetics research tends to focus on discrete and insular
populations that overlap with socially constructed racial or ethnic groups. Part
III locates behavioral genetics research on a spectrum spanning from singlegene disorders to complex behavioral traits, positing that the behavioral end of
the spectrum carries the most potential for stigma. Part IV explores how the
blame-shifting mechanisms of genetic reductionism and genetic determinism
affect the individual, family, community, and society when genetics research
focuses on criminal or antisocial behavior. Part V analyzes how racial and
ethnic stigma arise from behavioral genetics research and perpetuate inequality.
Part VI concludes by considering the ethical dilemmas that geneticists face
when choosing who and what to study.
***
The Genes on Trial program was part of a series of Fred Friendly Seminars
entitled Our Genes/Our Choices.4 Fifteen panelists were sequestered together
for several days and assigned to play roles in the hypothetical scenarios
described above.
Professor Charles Ogletree of Harvard Law School
moderated the discussion by posing questions and introducing factual

1. GENES ON TRIAL: GENETICS, BEHAVIOR, AND THE LAW (Films for the Humanities &
Sciences 2004) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/fredfriendly/ourgenes/transcripts/GENES_
TRANSCRIPT.pdf).
2. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (William Charvat et al. eds., Ohio State
University Press 1962) (1850).
3. John F. Dovidio et al., Stigma: Introduction and Overview, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
STIGMA 1, 3 (Todd F. Heatherton et al. eds., 2000).
4. Our Genes/Our Choices, http://www.pbs.org/inthebalance/archives/ourgenes/index.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2005). The other two programs in the series were WHO GETS TO KNOW? GENETICS
AND PRIVACY (Films for the Humanities & Sciences 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/fredfriendly/ourgenes/transcripts/WHOKNOWS_TRANSCRIPT.pdf)
and
MAKING BETTER BABIES: GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION (Films for the Humanities & Sciences
2004) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/fredfriendly/ourgenes/transcripts/BABIES_
TRANSCRIPT.pdf).
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complications into the scenarios. The purpose of this role-playing format was to
create a “human drama” that would help both the panelists and the audience
“to consider the issues in all their complexity.”5
The program began with a discussion of the implications of participating in
behavioral genetics research. Stanley Crouch, a columnist for the New York
Daily News, and Karen Rothenberg played the roles of the Tracy Islander
parents who were asked to participate in a study on a gene variant associated
with alcoholism. While they were concerned about their son’s growing
symptoms of alcoholism, they were also wary of the study’s potential impact on
their family. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer played the role of the
uncle who encouraged the family to participate in the research for its
contribution to scientific knowledge, while Professor Patricia King of
Georgetown University Law Center played the role of another family member
who feared that the research would stigmatize all Tracy Islanders as alcoholics.
Dean Hamer, a geneticist at the National Cancer Institute, and David Goldman,
a geneticist at the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, played
the roles of university scientists, while Francis Collins, Director of the National
Human Genome Research Institute, played the role of the university president.
When the conversation turned to the potential impact of the research on the
Tracy Islander community, Reverend Colin Gracy of Northeastern University,
playing the role of a religious leader in the Tracy Islander community,
questioned the study’s focus on Tracy Islanders, as did Evan Balaban, a
neuroscientist at the College of Staten Island at the City University of New
York, and Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union,
who expressed concern about the status of Tracy Islanders as a historically
oppressed immigrant group. Barry Mehler, a professor of history at Ferris State
University, questioned whether discovering a gene variant correlated with
alcoholism would have any positive impact on social problems associated with
alcoholism, such as homelessness.
The program then considered the media’s role in interpreting and
disseminating the results of the research. Playing the role of a journalist
covering the study, Gwen Ifill, the managing editor of Washington Week,
defended the media’s role in exploring the impact of the study on the Tracy
Islander community, while Alan McGowan, President of the Gene Media
Forum, criticized unscrupulous journalists for reporting that “the gene for
alcoholism” had been discovered. Meanwhile, Charles Ogletree switched into
the role of “Brad Blueblood,” the host of a syndicated show called I’m Always
Right, who treated the study as evidence that Tracy Islanders were inherently
inferior.
On the same day the study was released, the fictional Tracy Islander parents
learned that their son Joseph had killed an off-duty police officer while drunk at

5. About Fred Friendly Seminars, http://www.pbs.org/inthebalance/archives/ourgenes/about.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
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a bar and was being charged with murder. Playing the role of Joseph’s defense
attorney, Johnnie Cochran explored the possibility of a “DNA defense,”
suggesting that Joseph was not responsible for murder because his genetic
predisposition toward alcoholism had “taken away his free will.” Meanwhile,
playing the role of the prosecutor, attorney Victoria Toensing argued that
Joseph should not be released on bail because, by his own admission, he had a
genetic proclivity to drink and to become violent.
The program concluded with a new proposal to study the genetic influences
on impulse control and aggression.
While several panelists expressed
skepticism about the value of such research, others emphasized the potential for
behavioral genetics research to remedy social problems and to alleviate human
suffering. Using the program as a springboard, this article explores how
genetics research on criminal or antisocial behavior has the unique potential to
ENTIAL TO stigmatize racial and ethnic minority groups in a manner that both
reflects and reinforces social inequality.
II
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS RESEARCH
6
AND “DISCRETE AND INSULAR MINORITIES”
From a geneticist’s perspective, the Tracy Islanders are very interesting because they had
a very small set of original founders, so there is less heterogeneity than we would expect
to find in their DNA—which, simply put . . . means we have a better chance of finding
an answer than if we look at a very outbred group with a lot of different genetic
contributions coming from a lot of places.
— Francis Collins, Director, National Human Genome Research Institute

7

One of the issues raised in the Genes on Trial program was why the genetics
research on alcoholism “targeted” an ethnic minority group like the Tracy
Islanders—an issue that becomes even more acute in the context of criminal
law. Several factors explain why the intersection of behavioral genetics
research and criminal law disproportionately affects racial and ethnic minority
groups. First, genetics research tends to focus on discrete and insular
populations that share a common ancestry and that often overlap with socially
constructed racial or ethnic minority groups. Second, the study of genetic
differences between racial or ethnic groups appeals to the persistent impulse in
our society to explain racial and ethnic differences in biological terms. Finally,
because racial and ethnic minority groups are disproportionately represented in
the criminal justice system, efforts to analyze the DNA of criminals will
inevitably be skewed toward these groups.

6. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also infra note 24 and
accompanying text.
7. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (playing the role of the university president).
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A. Race, Ethnicity, and Genetics
While race and ethnicity are difficult and contentious terms to define, this
article treats them both as social constructs with overlapping meanings.8
Whereas race refers to groups identified by physical traits and geographic
origin, ethnicity refers to groups sharing a common kinship, nationality,
religion, language, or culture.9
Because these categories are socially
constructed, their definitions depend on the social context. What is considered
“black” in the United States, for example, might be considered “white” in
Brazil.10 The U.S. Census Bureau recognizes five racial groups (“American
Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” “Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” and “White”) and one ethnic group
(“Hispanic or Latino”).11 Although race and ethnicity are distinct concepts, this
article analyzes them together for the purpose of exploring the impact of
behavioral genetics on populations that have socially constructed group
identities.
While recent forensics research suggests that race and ethnicity can be
identified by DNA analysis,12 it is commonly accepted among geneticists that
race and ethnicity are not biologically determined categories and that greater
genetic variation exists within racial groups than between them.13 Nevertheless,
race and ethnicity can serve as rough proxies for ancestry and may therefore be
salient to genetics research.14 For example, a particular racial or ethnic group
may exhibit a higher incidence of a particular gene variant than other groups, as
8. See STEPHEN CORNELL & DOUGLAS HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE: MAKING
IDENTITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 25–34 (1998).
9. See id. at 15–25. The federal hate crimes statute offers the following definitions: “the term
‘racial group’ means a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical
characteristics or biological descent,” 18 U.S.C. § 1093(6) (2000), and “the term ‘ethnic group’ means a
set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common cultural traditions or
heritage,” Id. at § 1093(2).
10. Michael J. Bamshad & Steve E. Olson, Does Race Exist?, 289 SCI. AM. 78, 80 (2003).
11. See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in 2000 Census and Beyond
(Apr. 12, 2000), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html; Revisions to the
Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782 (Oct. 30,
1997). The Office of Management and Budget, which sets the standards used in the U.S. Census,
defines “Hispanic or Latino” as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central
American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.” Id. at 58,789.
12. See, e.g., B. Devlin & Neil Risch, Ethnic Differentiation at VTNR Loci, with Specific Reference
to Forensic Applications, 51 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 534 (1992); Alex L. Lowe et al., Inferring Ethnic
Origin by Means of an S.T.R. Profile, 119 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 17 (2001). For a discussion of this
research, see Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, an Ever-Expanding DNA Forensic Database, and the
Specter of an Early-Twenty-First-Century Equivalent of Phrenology, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 313, 322–27 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
13. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. GRAVES, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM 1–7, 193–97 (2001); Guido Barbujani et al., An Apportionment of Human
DNA Diversity, 94 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 4516 (1997); Eliot Marshall, Cultural
Anthropology: DNA Studies Challenge the Meaning of Race, 282 SCIENCE 654 (1998).
14. See Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine,
39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 408–09 (2004); cf. Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination:
The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315 (1998) (distinguishing between proxy and
nonproxy discrimination).
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illustrated by the example of “the alcoholism gene” and the fictional Tracy
Islanders in the Genes on Trial program.
Real-life examples of this
phenomenon include the sickle-cell anemia gene in African Americans and the
Tay-Sachs gene in Ashkenazi Jews.15 This phenomenon does not indicate,
however, that race and ethnicity are genetically defined; rather, it reflects
evolutionary forces such as genetic drift, the founder effect, and the bottleneck
effect that affect the genetic composition of small, reproductively isolated
populations.16
Genetic drift is the fluctuation of gene frequencies within a small population
caused by random mutations.17 One form of genetic drift, known as the founder
effect, occurs when a population originates from a small set of ancestors and
maintains a random mutation through inbreeding because of voluntary or
forced isolation.18 This mechanism helps explain, for example, the high
incidence of the Tay-Sachs gene among Ashkenazi Jews19 and the virtual
absence of the B blood type among Native Americans.20 Another form of
genetic drift, known as the bottleneck effect, occurs when a catastrophic event,
such as famine, war, or an epidemic, wipes out a large portion of the population,
thereby changing the composition of the gene pool that will serve as the source
of repopulation.21 In both the founder effect and the bottleneck effect, it is the
inbreeding within a small population that is responsible for the unusually high
incidence of the mutation, not the genetic distinctiveness of the population
itself.22
In seeking to estimate the genetic influence on a particular trait, behavioral
geneticists tend to study populations with a relatively homogeneous gene pool
in order to isolate the effects of a particular gene variant on that behavioral
trait.23 Accordingly, they often focus on small, reproductively isolated
populations that share a common ancestral background. Such populations tend
to overlap with socially constructed racial or ethnic minority groups—what are
15. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 410.
16. See id. at 395, 418–26; see also Jacqueline Stevens, Racial Meanings and Scientific Methods:
Changing Policies for NIH-Sponsored Publications Reporting Human Variation, 28 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 1033, 1046–48 (2003).
17. See FRIEDRICH VOGEL & ARNO G. MOTULSKY, HUMAN GENETICS: PROBLEMS AND
APPROACHES 504–05 (2d ed. 1986); see also STEVE OLSON, MAPPING HUMAN HISTORY:
DISCOVERING THE PAST THROUGH OUR GENES 164–65 (2002) (“Genetic drift is more obvious in
such small interbreeding populations because an individual who has many children can flood a
population with distinctive genetic variants.”).
18. See Karen H. Rothenberg & Amy B. Rutkin, Toward a Framework of Mutualism: The Jewish
Community in Genetics Research, 1 COMMUNITY GENETICS 148, 150 (1998). For a technical
explanation of how rare recessive diseases can become prevalent in small populations due to the
founder effect, see VOGEL & MOTULSKY, supra note 17, at 508.
19. Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 425.
20. See ANTHONY J.F. GRIFFITHS et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 807 (6th ed.
1996).
21. See Rothenberg & Rutkin, supra note 18, at 150.
22. See Stevens, supra note 16, at 1046.
23. See Lon R. Cardon, Practical Barriers to Identifying Complex Trait Loci, in BEHAVIORAL
GENETICS IN THE POSTGENOMIC ERA 55, 61 (Robert Plomin et al. eds., 2003).
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known in constitutional law as “discrete and insular minorities.”24 This overlap
is significant because the very features of discreteness and insularity that make a
population useful for genetics research are also the features that make them
vulnerable to societal and governmental discrimination.
In genetics, populations affected by the founder and bottleneck effects are
“discrete” in that they can be identified by a common ancestral and
geographical origin, and they are “insular” in that they historically have been
reproductively isolated from the mainstream population. In constitutional law,
racial and ethnic minority groups are “discrete” in that they generally can be
identified by a distinct and often immutable trait, and they are “insular”
because they historically have been segregated from mainstream society and
excluded from the political process.25 Of course, the genetic, social, and legal
categories do not overlap entirely. Latinos, for example, are discrete and
insular minorities in the constitutional sense but not in the genetic sense
because their gene pool is relatively diverse. Likewise, while the Amish are
discrete and insular minorities in the genetic sense because their culture forbids
intermarriage, they are not considered racial or ethnic minorities in the
constitutional sense because they cannot be identified by a distinct physical trait
and historically have not been subject to the widespread discrimination and
forced segregation that African Americans, Jews, Latinos, Asians, and Native
Americans have experienced. Nonetheless, many of the discrete and insular
populations studied in behavioral genetics happen to be racial or ethnic
minority groups that have been subject to discrimination and segregation.
Because such treatment has included eugenics in the form of forced
sterilization, anti-miscegenation laws, and exclusionary immigration policies,
genetics research that focuses on these groups comes with specific historical
baggage that contributes to racial and ethnic stigma.26
B. The Allure of Genetic Difference
Besides the methodological advantage of studying discrete and insular
minority groups to isolate the effect of a particular gene variant, there is the
allure of explaining racial and ethnic differences in terms of genetics.27 In their
book The DNA Mystique, Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee document how the

24. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
25. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 145–70 (1980). In defining “suspect classifications” that warrant strict judicial scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has identified three
criteria for discrete and insular minorities: those who exhibit “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group”; those who historically have been subject to
discrimination; and those who are a “minority or politically powerless.” Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
638 (1986).
26. See ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 27–46
(2000); Rothenberg & Rutkin, supra note 18, at 150. For cases discussing these policies, see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (forced sterilization);
and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (immigration).
27. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 23; Stevens, supra note 16, at 1072.
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rhetorical and imagistic power of the gene has permeated American culture,
especially in explaining and justifying social inequalities.28 It is no surprise, then,
that the focus on racial and ethnic minority groups in behavioral genetics
research is readily accepted and appropriated by a popular culture that
embraces the idea of genetic differences between socially constructed groups.
This phenomenon is reflected in the growing body of research on the genetic
bases for differences in disease susceptibility and drug reactions among racial
and ethnic groups.29 One of the most well-known examples is research on the
BRCA mutations associated with breast cancer in Ashkenazi Jewish women.30
Other examples include research on a genetic link to prostate cancer in African
American men, genetic mutations linked to asthma in individuals of Middle
Eastern descent, and a gene variant associated with scleroderma in Native
Americans.31 Based on genetics research on variations in drug reactions among
different racial and ethnic groups,32 pharmaceutical companies are now
marketing drugs for specific racial and ethnic groups, such as BiDil, a
hypertension drug targeted at African Americans.33 On a broader scale, the
newly launched International HapMap Project seeks to “find genes that affect
health, disease, and individual responses to medications and environmental
factors” by studying four population groups from Nigeria, Japan, China, and the
United States.34
Such research is driven in part by government policies that seek to include
racial and ethnic minority groups in medical research. As mandated by federal
statute,35 for example, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) requires all
federally funded clinical research to include racial and ethnic minorities as
subjects unless such inclusion is “inappropriate,” and to review any evidence of

28. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL
ICON (1995).
29. Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 393; Stevens, supra note 16, at 1034.
30. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic “Quick Fix,” and the Jewish
Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 98 (1997); Stevens, supra note 16, at 1042. For a technical explanation
of the BRCA mutations, see JACK J. PASTERNAK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN MOLECULAR
GENETICS: MECHANISMS OF INHERITED DISEASES 490–92 (2d ed. 2005).
31. Stevens, supra note 16, at 1056–57. One of the most controversial examples is the “slavery
hypothesis,” which seeks to explain the higher incidence of hypertension among African Americans by
positing that when their ancestors were brought as slaves from Africa to America, those with genetic
predispositions toward salt retention were more likely to survive the arduous voyage and thus form the
original gene pool of African Americans. See id. at 1071–73; Stephen J. Dubner, Toward a Unified
Theory of Black America, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 20, 2005, at 54 (describing the work of Harvard
economist Roland Fryer); Jay S. Kaufman, The Anatomy of a Medical Myth, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Kaufman (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
32. See Stevens, supra note 16, at 1058–59.
33. Sally L. Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 5, 2002, at 58.
34. International HapMap Project, About the HapMap (2002), http://www.hapmap.org/thehap
map.html.en.
35. NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 289a-2 (2000).
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“significant” racial or ethnic differences in the intervention effect.36 Similarly,
the Food and Drug Administration advocates the collection of race and
ethnicity data in all clinical trials.37 As a form of affirmative action in medical
research, these guidelines engender tension analogous to that surrounding
racial and ethnic affirmative action in higher education and employment. While
colorblindness in those contexts may only perpetuate “the effects of centuries of
law-sanctioned inequality,”38 singling out racial and ethnic minorities for special
treatment threatens to stigmatize them as “undeserving.”39 Similarly, when
placed in the context of genetics research, the focus on racial and ethnic
minorities may be a mixed blessing: while it may draw attention and resources
to problems afflicting the minority community, it may also stigmatize the
community as genetically inferior and reify the socially constructed notion of
race.40 This tension exists, for example, in the Jewish community regarding
research on the BRCA gene variants associated with breast cancer. While some
members of the community welcome such research for its potential to advance
both the community’s health and society’s scientific knowledge, others view the
research as targeting Jews for genetic screening in the historical shadow of Nazi
eugenics.41
A related concern in the African American community is that genetics
research on racial differences in health traits will legitimize genetics research on
racial differences in behavioral traits.42 Indeed, the allure of genetic difference
is not limited to medical research. Traits that recently have been attributed to
heredity in the mass media include aggression, intelligence, homosexuality,
impulsiveness, exhibitionism, family loyalty, addiction, religiosity, deviance,
learning disability, and happiness.43 As illustrated by the controversial bestseller
The Bell Curve,44 perhaps one of the most pervasive and perverse ideas in
American society is that blacks are genetically less intelligent than whites and
Asians.45 This impulse to seek genetic explanations for racial and ethnic

36. National Institutes of Health, NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and
Minorities
as
Subjects
in
Clinical
Research
(Oct.
2001),
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/women_min/ guidelines_amended_10_2001.htm.
37. See Draft Guidance for Industry on the Collection of Race and Ethnicity in Clinical Trials for
FDA Regulated Products, 68 Fed. Reg. 4788 (Jan. 30, 2003).
38. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 399–400.
41. See Rothenberg & Rutkin, supra note 18, at 149–50; Marc D. Schwartz, Karen Rothenberg,
Linda Joseph, Judith Benkendorf, & Caryn Lerman, Consent to the Use of Stored DNA for Genetics
Research: A Survey of Attitudes in the Jewish Population, 98 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 336 (2001).
42. See Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 392, 399–40.
43. See Dorothy Nelkin, Behavioral Genetics and Dismantling the Welfare State, in BEHAVIORAL
GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 156, 156 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A.
Rothstein eds., 1999) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL GENETICS].
44. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
45. See GRAVES, supra note 13, at 157–72; NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 112–17.
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differences may explain why behavioral genetics research that focuses on racial
and ethnic minority groups is so readily sensationalized in the popular press.
C. Racial and Ethnic Bias and the Criminal Justice System
When placed in the context of criminal law, behavioral genetics research is
even more likely to focus on racial and ethnic minority groups. Although
“stereotypes about race and crime may make it more likely that researchers will
look for a gene for aggression or criminality in a minority population,”46 the
more likely scenario is that genetics research on criminal behavior will focus on
blacks and Latinos simply because they are disproportionately represented in
the criminal population. From 1990 to 2004, blacks were five times more likely
than whites to be incarcerated,47 and in 2000, blacks and Latinos comprised 63%
of incarcerated adults, even though together they represented only 25% of the
total population.48
Attributing these trends to the War on Drugs, racial profiling,
discriminatory sentencing, and general racial bias in the criminal justice system,
sociologist Troy Duster warns that because African Americans are
disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, behavioral
genetics research relying on the DNA samples of convicted criminals will
inevitably be skewed toward that population.49 All fifty states, along with the
U.S. Army and the FBI, now contribute to the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS), a national database containing the DNA profiles of nearly 2.5 million
convicted offenders.50 Although currently used only for identification and
forensic purposes, these DNA profiles could potentially be used for behavioral
genetics research, resulting in a study implicitly focusing on African Americans
and Latinos.51 The results of that study, in turn, could stigmatize all African
Americans and Latinos as prone to criminal behavior, thereby reinforcing
existing stereotypes and promoting discrimination in other contexts.

46. Lori B. Andrews, Predicting and Punishing Antisocial Acts: How the Criminal Justice System
Might Use Behavioral Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 43, at 116, 133.
47. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Blacks Were Two Times More Likely
Than Hispanics and Five Times More Likely Than Whites To Be in Jail (Apr. 24, 2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/jailrair.htm.
48. Human Rights Watch, Race and Incarceration in the United States (Feb. 27, 2002),
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/race.
49. See Duster, supra note 12, at 316–22, 328–29; Troy Duster, Genetics, Race, and Crime:
Recurring Seduction to a False Precision, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC INFORMATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 129, 132–33 (Paul R. Billings ed., 1992); Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307
SCIENCE 1050, 1051 (2005); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 134.
50. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National DNA Index System (July 2005),
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm.
51. See David Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 361 (Winter/Spring 2006).
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III
FROM DISEASE TO BEHAVIOR: THE SPECTRUM OF GENETICS RESEARCH
[G]enetics is an incredibly powerful science when . . . [we] know what we’re studying.
When we have a condition that is medically defined, like heart disease, we have a clearly
defined population of things that we’re trying to study and learn about. When we move
to something like alcoholism, that may be a whole lot more nebulous, [but] at least there
is clinical agreement on patterns of behavior that constitute a problem. Now, we have
moved into a brand new arena. We are using terms—“impulsiveness,” “aggression”—

that are very difficult to define in the operational ways that scientists need to define
things.
52

— Evan Balaban, Professor, College of Staten Island, City University of New York

The Genes on Trial program concluded with a hypothetical proposal to
study the genetic bases of impulsiveness and aggression. As reflected in the
skepticism expressed by several of the panelists, the strength and impact of
genetics research vary along the spectrum of traits that are studied. As one
moves toward the behavioral end of the spectrum, the genetic influence on a
trait becomes more uncertain and difficult to isolate, while the stigma associated
with such influence becomes more significant. Because criminality is a stigmatic
trait, any research on the genetic influence on criminal behavior threatens to
stigmatize the population being studied.
A. The Spectrum of Genetics Research
Genetic research exists on a spectrum that varies in the complexity and
precision of the traits being studied. At one end of the spectrum is the study of
single-gene disorders, such as sickle-cell anemia and Huntington’s disease,
which are caused by a single gene variant. Even at this end of the spectrum,
however, where the relationship between genotype and phenotype is the
closest, geneticists cannot always predict with certainty when the condition will
develop or how severe it will be.53
Next on the spectrum is the study of complex medical diseases, such as
cancer, caused by the interaction of multiple genetic and environmental factors.
Although a single gene variant, such as the BRCA mutations associated with
breast cancer, may increase the probability of developing the disease, it remains
difficult to isolate the effect of the mutation from that of other genetic and
environmental factors.54 Thus, even if an individual has the gene variant
associated with cancer, one cannot predict whether that individual will actually
develop cancer, much less when she will develop it and how severe it will be.55
52. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1.
53. Mark A. Rothstein, Behavioral Genetic Determinism: Its Effects on Culture and Law, in
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 43, at 89, 92; Francis S. Collins et al., Heredity and Humanity,
NEW REPUBLIC, June 25, 2001, at 27–28.
54. See Rothstein, supra note 53, at 92–93.
55. Rothenberg & Rutkin, supra note 18, at 151.
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Further on the spectrum is the study of complex behavioral conditions or
diseases, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, and depression. The genetic
influence on these conditions is even more difficult to isolate because their
symptoms often involve an element of individual choice. Moreover, such
conditions are more elusive research subjects because they are more difficult to
define and to diagnose than medical diseases like hypertension and breast
cancer. Nevertheless, as Evan Balaban pointed out during the Genes on Trial
program, these conditions at least have clinical definitions upon which scientists
can agree.
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum is the study of behavioral traits,
such as aggression, intelligence, and impulsiveness. Like behavioral conditions
or diseases, these traits are influenced not only by genetic and environmental
factors, but also by individual choices, thus making their heritability difficult to
identify. And because of their social and political implications, the definitions
of these traits are often as hotly contested as their heritability.56 Thus,
behavioral traits are the most indeterminate and controversial subjects of
genetics research. At the same time, they may be the most relevant to criminal
law. Although genetic disorders like Huntington’s disease and XYY trisomy
have formed the bases of criminal defenses in the past,57 criminal law is now
particularly interested in behavioral conditions that contribute to violence, such
as alcoholism and mental illness, and antisocial behavioral traits, such as
aggression.58
B. The Stigma of Behavior
The behavioral end of the spectrum of genetics research is not only the most
scientifically problematic, but also the most potentially stigmatic. As explained
above, behavioral traits are not as precisely defined as diseases and thus are
subject to manipulation and misunderstanding. Moreover, because behavioral
traits involve a strong element of individual choice, they are more closely
associated with fault, even if they are deemed genetic. Ironically, the weaker
the causal link between the gene and the condition, the more stigmatizing the
gene may be, since those who carry the gene are grouped with those who are at

56. See Rothstein, supra note 53, at 93. The line between behavioral conditions or diseases and
behavioral traits is blurry and tentative; it may well be that if research were to definitively link
aggression to a particular gene, it would be considered a disease. However, it is useful for the purpose
of this article to distinguish between conditions or diseases that have clinical definitions on which
scientists commonly agree and traits that lack operational definitions and criteria for diagnosis.
57. See TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENETIC DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM 69–72 (2d
ed. 2003); Andrews, supra note 46, at 124–26. For examples of defenses based on Huntington’s disease,
see United States v. Click, 807 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. State, 354 S.E.2d 124 (Ga. 1987);
Scammahorn v. State, 506 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1987); and People v. Ponke, No. 180310, 1997 WL
33354421 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 1997). For examples of defenses based on XYY trisomy, see People
v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1970); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); and State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1976).
58. See, e.g., PETERS, supra note 57, at 77 (discussing the connection between crime and alcohol).
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“fault” for their condition. For example, as long as some cases of alcoholism
can be attributed entirely to individual choice, alcoholics who are genetically
predisposed toward the condition bear the burden of demonstrating that they,
unlike their counterparts, did not “choose” to become alcoholics—a burden
that individuals with sickle-cell anemia, for example, never have to bear.
Furthermore, traits that potentially threaten society, such as aggression, are
more stigmatic than traits that potentially threaten individual health, such as
Tay-Sachs disease.59 Whereas the latter is a basis for making individual
decisions about marriage and childbearing,60 the former is a basis for making
social policies about surveillance and preventive detention.61 Similarly, stigma
associated with criminal or antisocial behavior is more far-reaching and
disabling than stigma associated with disease because one’s behavior is relevant
to a wider range of social contexts. While there already is extensive literature
on the potential for genetic discrimination in insurance and employment,
genetics information has many other potential applications, such as in
educational placement, tort liability, loan approval, and child custody.62 A
genetic predisposition toward impulsiveness, for example, might not only
increase one’s car insurance rates but also count against one’s creditworthiness
in a mortgage application. More immediately, many of the bases for
termination of parental rights, such as cruelty, alcoholism, mental illness, sexual
promiscuity, and criminal activity, are traits being studied in behavioral genetics
research.63 Because a genetic predisposition toward criminal or antisocial
behavior is relevant to nearly every aspect of life, the stigma associated with
that predisposition is especially threatening.
IV
THE FAULTY GENE: REDUCTIONISM, DETERMINISM, AND BLAME SHIFTING
Let’s say you do this study and you find out that our family or groups of families have
these predispositions [toward alcoholism]. I’m worried he’s going to drink more
because now he’s going to have an excuse. And he’s going to say, “See, I’m not a bad
guy. You did it, Mom and Dad, both of you did it to [me].”
64

— Karen Rothenberg, Dean, University of Maryland School of Law

59. Cf. id. at 72 (“If we carry a defective gene for breast cancer, then we certainly can feel empathy
for someone else who carries the gene for cystic fibrosis. But if that other person carries a gene
predisposing him or her to harm us, then this adds an additional element of considerable
consequence.”). But see id. at 66–67 (noting that individuals with Huntington’s disease are stigmatized
as violent).
60. See, e.g., Rothenberg & Rutkin, supra note 18, at 151.
61. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 132–38.
62. See id. at 131, 138; Rothstein, supra note 53, at 107.
63. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 138. For a discussion of statutes and case law governing the
termination of parental rights based on behavioral traits, see Sherry S. Zimmerman, Annotation,
Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 113 A.L.R.
5th 349 (2003).
64. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (playing the role of the mother).
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What the study tells me is that your problems are not the result of job discrimination; it’s
not the result of any kind of ethnic bias; it’s not the result of poverty or anything else.
The problem is inside of you. It’s not the environment. It’s you.
65

— Charles Ogletree, Professor, Harvard Law School

[T]he flip side of the defense of this particular individual is an indictment, so to speak,
of not only him but the entire community.
— Nadine Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union

66

As illustrated by the Genes on Trial program, behavioral genetics research,
like other genetics research, is vulnerable to the fallacies of genetic
reductionism and genetic determinism. By overstating the genetic influence on
human behavior, these fallacies shift blame among the individual, family,
community, and society. Like the individual’s decision to participate in
behavioral genetics research, the individual’s decision to use such research to
support a criminal defense can operate as a double-edged sword: while it may
mitigate his culpability by shifting blame away from his “free will,” it may also
stigmatize him, his family, and his racial or ethnic community as being prone to
criminal behavior.
A. Genetic Reductionism, Genetic Determinism, and Blame Shifting
Genetic reductionism is the impulse to treat genetics, or even a single gene,
as the sole cause of a particular trait, discounting the interaction of other genes,
the environment, and “free will.”67 The idea of “the alcoholism gene” is an
example of genetic reductionism, as it treats alcoholism as a single-gene
disorder unaffected by other genes, the environment, or individual choice.
Genetic determinism is the impulse to treat DNA as destiny, discounting the
possibility of deviating from one’s genetic predisposition.68 The idea that an
individual is “hardwired” to become an alcoholic is an example of genetic
determinism, as it suggests that a predisposition toward alcoholism cannot be
changed by individual choice or social intervention.69 Together, genetic
reductionism and genetic determinism describe different aspects of the same
fallacy: the overemphasis on the influence of genes on human behavior.70

65. Id. (playing the role of “Brad Blueblood”).
66. Id.
67. Rothenberg, supra note 30, at 102–03 (“Genetic reductionism results when all traits, health
problems, and behaviors become attributable to genes and no attention is paid to other potential
factors.”).
68. See id. (“Genetic determinism results when an individual believes her future is defined and
predicted by genetic makeup and cannot be changed.”).
69. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 195–96 (“Traits that are genetic appear as immutable,
deeply resistant to change initiated through individual action or external intervention. . . . The ideology
of genetic essentialism encourages submission to nature and to constraints on the possibilities for social
change.”).
70. See Rothenberg, supra note 30, at 102–03 (“Genetic myopia is a condition that results from
viewing everything from the perspective of genetics.”). Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee call this
condition “genetic essentialism,” which “reduces the self to a molecular entity, equating human beings,
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Whereas genetic reductionism is a backward-looking framework for
understanding the cause of a trait, genetic determinism is a forward-looking
framework for predicting the future. Both are appealing in part because they
“extend the certainty and predictability of science to troubling and
controversial terrains.”71 They also reflect the emphasis in current American
political culture on individual responsibility, as opposed to societal or
governmental intervention.72
Because the concept of fault is closely linked to the concept of causation,73
and because genetic reductionism and genetic determinism treat the gene as the
ultimate and determinative cause of a particular behavior, they shift blame for
the behavior away from both individual “free will” and the environment created
by the family, community, and society.74 In the context of criminal law, as
illustrated by the Genes on Trial program, the defendant can invoke a reductive
and determinist view of behavioral genetics to shift blame away from his “free
will” and thus demonstrate either that he lacked the mens rea to commit the
offense or that he does not deserve the full extent of punishment because he is
not fully culpable for the crime.75
B. Effects of Blame Shifting on the Individual, Family, Community, and Society
When viewed through a determinist lens, behavioral genetics research can
create a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, when an individual learns that
she is genetically predisposed to alcoholism, she may react in one of two ways:
If she believes her genetic background is only a predisposition and not
predestination, she may be more vigilant about not drinking in order to avoid
triggering her heightened appetite for alcohol. But if she takes the determinist
view and believes that she cannot control her drinking and thus cannot be
blamed for becoming addicted to alcohol, she may actually drink more than she
would otherwise.76 By shifting blame to her genes and away from her individual
autonomy, she fulfills the prophecy of genetic determinism.
In some cases, behavioral genetics research may provide “moral relief for
stigmatized conditions” by framing the behavioral trait as a “natural” result of
in all their social, historical, and moral complexity, with their genes.” NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note
28, at 2.
71. Nelkin, supra note 43, at 158.
72. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 128–29.
73. In tort law, for example, a person who causes an injury is deemed to be at fault and thus
responsible for compensating the victim of the injury. For a philosophical discussion of the relationship
between causal responsibility and moral blameworthiness, see MARION SMILEY, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY (1992).
74. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 119.
75. See id. at 120–21; see also Nita Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., Behavioral Genetics and
Criminal Responsibility: Reconciling Practice with Theory, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115
(Winter/Spring 2006).
76. See Allison Morse, Searching for the Holy Grail: The Human Genome Project and Its
Implications, 13 J. L. & HEALTH 219, 241–42 (1999) (“[Research demonstrates that] a person who
believes she is an alcoholic, when informed a particular drink contains alcohol, will consume more of
the drink than the average person, even if there is no alcohol in the drink.”).
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human biology rather than a conscious choice of moral depravity.77 Many gay
rights activists, for example, welcome research on the so-called gay gene
because it responds to charges that homosexuality is “unnatural” and shifts
blame away from individual choices.78 Indeed, such research was pioneered by
gay men, including geneticist Dean Hamer and neuroscientist Simon LeVay.79
Some members of the gay community expect genetics research on
homosexuality to advance gay rights, as courts have denied gays and lesbians
heightened constitutional protection from discrimination precisely because they
view homosexuality as “behavioral” and not “immutable” like race and sex.80
Others point out, however, that attributing homosexuality to a genetic mutation
may suggest that gays and lesbians are “abnormal” and that homosexuality can
be “cured” like other “disorders.”81 Even more troubling, discovery of a “gay
gene” could lead to genetic screening, genetic engineering, and selective
abortion of gay fetuses.82
Similar dynamics exist with respect to the family. In some instances,
behavioral genetics research may shift blame away from the environment that
parents create for their children. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example,
schizophrenia was blamed on poor parenting, particularly the uncaring mother.83
The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill thus supported research on the
genetic link to schizophrenia “because it relieved the parents of the mentally ill
from blame.”84 At the same time, however, parents of the mentally ill fear that
they may be blamed for passing on “defective” genes and thus be restricted in
their reproductive freedom.85
When behavioral genetics research associates a gene with both a deviant
behavior and a racial or ethnic community, genetic reductionism and genetic

77. Nelkin, supra note 43, at 158.
78. See PETERS, supra note 57, at 97–98; Rothstein, supra note 53, at 96.
79. See, e.g., DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR
THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR (1994); Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between
DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993); Simon A.
LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253
SCIENCE 1034 (1991). For a discussion of this research, see NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 119–
20, and PETERS, supra note 57, at 98–102.
80. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573–74 (9th Cir. 1990);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
81. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 122 (quoting a National Enquirer headline: “Simple
injection will let gay men turn straight, doctors report”); PETERS, supra note 57, at 106–07; Rothstein,
supra note 53, at 96.
82. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 122 (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Janet
Halley’s prediction that genetic explanations for homosexuality will encourage “the development of
anti-gay eugenics”); PETERS, supra note 57, at 107. The prospect of aborting a gay fetus was the subject
of Jonathan Tolins’s 1993 Broadway play The Twilight of the Golds.
83. David C. Rowe & Kristen C. Jacobsen, In the Mainstream: Research in Behavioral Genetics, in
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, supra note 43, at 12, 14–15.
84. Nelkin, supra note 43, at 167; see also NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 147; Allan J. Tobin,
Amazing Grace: Sources of Phenotypic Variation in Genetic Boosterism, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS,
supra note 43, at 1–2.
85. See NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 28, at 147; Nelkin, supra note 43, at 167.
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determinism may shift blame to the community itself in the form of racial or
ethnic stigma.
Because behavioral genetics research draws statistical
conclusions about a sample population and not about specific individuals, it is
likely that an individual who possesses a trait will not know whether he
possesses the gene variant associated with the trait. The only thing he will know
is that he is a member of the racial or ethnic group associated with the gene.
Because the only known “cause” of the trait is membership in the racial or
ethnic group, it is the group itself that bears the brunt of the blame.
By attributing a trait entirely to genetic factors, a reductive and determinist
view of behavioral genetics research can also shift blame away from
environmental factors created by society. To avoid legal liability and social
disapproval for causing medical and behavioral maladies, industries are now
funding genetics research to shift blame away from their products. For
example, the Ernest Gallo Clinic and Research Center established by Gallo
Winery at the University of California San Francisco conducts research on the
genetic link to alcoholism. If such a link is established, “some of the social
pressure against alcoholic beverages and their purveyors might be deflected
onto ‘faulty’ genes.”86 Tobacco companies fund similar research on lung
cancer,87 and genetic predisposition to a disease is a common defense in toxic
tort litigation.88 By locating the cause of the trait in the individual’s genome,
genetic reductionism shifts blame away from the industry. By framing the trait
as predestined and immutable, genetic determinism alleviates pressure for the
industry to change the toxic environment that it creates.
Similarly, research that seeks to explain racial or ethnic inequality in terms
of genetics both shifts blame away from societal and governmental
discrimination and alleviates pressure for society and the state to change the
discriminatory environments that they create. Genetic reductionism justifies
racial and ethnic inequality as the “natural” result of innate differences.
Genetic determinism rejects societal and governmental efforts to eliminate
inequality as futile, since such inequality is genetically predestined.89 The Bell
Curve, for example, argued that social welfare programs and affirmative action
are futile because blacks are genetically less intelligent than whites and Asians.90
As Dorothy Nelkin concludes:
[B]y locating the source of social problems within the individual, theories of genetic
causation also serve political agendas, for they reduce the responsibility of the state.

86. Rothstein, supra note 53, at 96; see also Nelkin, supra note 43, at 160.
87. See Nelkin, supra note 43, at 167 (citing Jon Cohen, Tobacco Money Lights Up a Debate, 272
SCIENCE 488 (1996)).
88. See id.; cf. Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative
Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755, 1756 (1997) (“Some state laws provide for
genetic testing by employers in order to determine an employee’s susceptibility to toxic chemicals or
substances in the workplace, even though cleaning up the environment would enhance the working
conditions for all employees and would alleviate the need for genetic testing of individual employees.”).
89. See Rothstein, supra note 53, at 95 (“[G]enetic determinism is the scientific justification for
social inequality, social Darwinism, and the status quo.”); see also Nelkin, supra note 43, at 164.
90. PETERS, supra note 57, at 82–83 (describing The Bell Curve’s hypotheses).
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Moreover, genetic explanations of behavior translate into moral guidelines about
normal, or natural behavior. At the same time, they provide the equivalent of moral
absolution, exonerating individuals by attributing antisocial acts to an independent
91
biological force beyond the influence of volition—the DNA.

C. Blame Shifting as a Double-Edged Sword in Criminal Law
Although blame shifting may seem attractive to a criminal defendant,
invoking genetic reductionism and genetic determinism to support a criminal
defense can be a double-edged sword. As illustrated by the scenario presented
in the Genes on Trial program, an individual’s decision to introduce evidence of
a genetic predisposition toward criminal behavior can backfire on himself, his
family, and his community. If the defendant claims that he cannot control his
genetic tendency toward violence, the government may turn that against him
and argue that he should not be released on bail or given the possibility of
parole, as he poses a permanent danger to society. And if this particular
defendant has the “gene for aggression,” the argument goes, then members of
his family and racial or ethnic group likely have the gene too. Nelkin warns: “If
it is accepted that genetic endowment determines the propensity to commit bad
acts, then hereditary traits, which often reduce to ethnic group membership,
may one day be considered evidence of the commission of the crime.”92
This possibility is not as remote as one would hope. In a recent case, an
Ohio trial court sentenced a Native American defendant, who had been
convicted of assaulting two police officers while she was drunk, to quit her job
as a waitress in a bar, to refrain from consuming alcohol for two years, to
undergo alcoholism counseling, and to “write a paper regarding your [sic]—for
educational purposes—on alcoholism and the American Indians.”93 During
trial, the court asked the defendant’s mother whether she knew “anything about
genetic predisposition to alcoholism,” whether she had “ever been on an Indian
reservation,” and whether “she had ever seen ‘the Scotch or Irish drinking.’”94
The trial court also asked the defendant’s mother whether she was concerned
“that her daughter would become ‘a flaming alcoholic’ because, with such an
ethnic background, ‘there [was] nothing she can do about it.’”95
Similarly, employing genetic reductionism and genetic determinism in a
criminal defense may stigmatize those who carry the “faulty” gene in other
contexts. When research in the 1960s suggested a link between XYY trisomy
and violence, for example, not only did criminal defendants blame their
violence on their extra Y chromosome,96 but thousands of law-abiding XYY

91. Nelkin, supra note 43, at 158.
92. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 313, 331 (1992).
93. State v. Madey, No. 81166, 2002 WL 31429827, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2002) (emphasis
removed) (quoting the trial court).
94. Id. at *1 (quoting the trial court).
95. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
96. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 57.
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males were stigmatized as “congenital criminals,” and hospitals began screening
newborns for XYY, potentially for selective abortion.97 Likewise, when
Huntington’s disease was raised as part of an insanity defense by a woman who
had shot her children,98 the Huntington’s Disease Society of America worried
that the defense would stigmatize all Huntington’s sufferers as violent and lead
to discrimination in other areas, such as employment.99 As theologian Ted
Peters puts it: “One possible scenario from such a precedent is that genetic
determinism might end up declaring those committing crimes innocent and
stigmatizing those not committing crimes as potentially guilty.”100
V
THE DISCREDITING GENE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC STIGMA
Tracy Islanders are going to be known as the alcoholics of the country. And so
whenever I go someplace and they say, “Oh, you’re a Tracy Islander,” they will say,
“Oh, we don’t want to hire you.” Or they will say, “Oh, you come from that group, that
genetically deformed, defective group. You carry the gene for alcoholism.”
— Patricia King, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center

101

When viewed through the lenses of reductionism and determinism,
behavioral genetics research has a unique potential to stigmatize racial and
ethnic minority groups. Because of the “discrete and insular” character of these
groups, and because of the salience of race and ethnicity in our society, racial
and ethnic stigmas are more powerful and pervasive than other types of stigma.
A. Deconstructing Stigma
The term “stigma” historically refers to a physical mark branded on a
criminal or slave to identify the person as dangerous or subhuman.102 Like the
“A” that marks the adulteress in The Scarlet Letter, a stigma serves as a badge
of opprobrium, signaling to society that the individual should be “discredited,
scorned, and avoided.”103 Racial and ethnic stigmas are “dishonorable meanings
socially inscribed on arbitrary bodily marks,” such as skin color, that identify an
individual as a member of a racial or ethnic group.104 A racially stigmatized

97. See PETERS, supra note 57, at 69–72. See generally DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON,
GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS AND HUMAN VALUES 141–59 (1989).
98. Caldwell v. State, 354 S.E. 2d 124 (Ga. 1987).
99. PETERS, supra note 57, at 66–67; Andrews, supra note 46, at 119–20, 125.
100. PETERS, supra note 57, at 67.
101. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (playing the role of a Tracy Islander).
102. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1
(1963); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803, 814–15 (2004); see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 689 (2d ed. 1989).
103. Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 814 (quoting Steven L. Neuberg et al., Why People Stigmatize:
Toward a Biocultural Framework, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STIGMA, supra note 3, at 31, 31).
104. Id. at 809 (quoting GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 59 (2002)).
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person is “reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one,” undeserving of full participation in mainstream society.105
Not coincidentally, these definitions of racial and ethnic stigma overlap with
the constitutional criteria for “discrete and insular minorities” who, because of
their stigmatized social status, require special judicial solicitude.106 The notion
of stigma provides a conceptual link among the criteria: it is because the
discrete marks of race and ethnicity signal inferiority that racial and ethnic
minority groups historically have been subject to discrimination and excluded
from mainstream society. In addition, just as the discreteness and insularity of
racial and ethnic minority groups are what make them “interesting” subjects of
genetics research,107 they are also what make racial and ethnic stigmas more
pernicious than other types of stigma.
In the context of behavioral genetics, the “faulty” gene associated with
criminal or antisocial behavior is the mark that identifies the individual as
dangerous and subhuman. The potential for racial or ethnic stigma arises when
behavioral genetics research associates the faulty gene with a racial or ethnic
minority group.108 Because the faulty gene cannot be readily perceived and thus
serves as a poor signaling device,109 the physical marks of race or ethnicity, such
as skin color, take its place, serving as outward reflections of the faulty gene.
Thus, while the faulty gene stigmatizes those who carry it, the link between the
faulty gene and the racial or ethnic minority group stigmatizes all members of
the group, regardless of whether they carry the faulty gene.
B. Racial and Ethnic Stigma in Context
The racial or ethnic stigma that arises from the “faulty” gene is even more
powerful when the behavior associated with the gene maps onto preexisting
stereotypes about the racial or ethnic group. Because racial and ethnic stigmas
are social constructs, their existence and salience depend on the social context
in which the behavioral genetics research is conducted.110 For example, studying
the genetic influence on alcoholism in the Irish or the Native American
105. Id. at 818 (quoting GOFFMAN, supra note 102, at 3).
106. See supra Part II.A. See generally Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000). Glenn Loury defines “race” as “a cluster of inheritable bodily
markings carried by a largely endogamous group of individuals, markings that can be observed by
others with ease, that can be changed or misrepresented only with great difficulty, and that have come
to be invested in a particular society at a given historical moment with social meaning. This definition
has three aspects: ease of identification, relative immutability, and social signification.” LOURY, supra
note 104, at 20–21. This definition also overlaps with the Supreme Court’s definition of “discrete and
insular minorities” as those who exhibit “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group”; those who historically have been subject to discrimination; and those
who are a “minority or politically powerless.” Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
107. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (Francis Collins).
108. Cf. PETERS, supra note 57, at 73 (“If we identify crime with genes and then genes with race,
then we may inadvertently provide a biological support for prejudice and discrimination.”).
109. Cf. GOFFMAN, supra note 102, at 43–51 (explaining how stigma symbols convey negative social
information and thus must be readily perceived by others).
110. See Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 821.
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community has greater potential for stigma than studying alcoholism in the
Jewish community. Likewise, studying the heritability of aggression in the
African American community has greater potential for stigma than studying
aggression in the Amish community.111
As mentioned above, racial and ethnic stigmas are especially threatening
because of the discreteness and insularity of the racial or ethnic minority group.
First, because the physical marks of racial and ethnic identity are distinct,
observable, and generally immutable, racial and ethnic stigmas are more
difficult to avoid by “converting,” “passing,” or “covering.”112 In other words,
because the groups are discrete and insular, it is more difficult for members of
the group to assimilate into the mainstream in order to avoid the shadow of
stigma. Second, a history of discrimination, especially genetic discrimination,
lends additional resonance to racial and ethnic stigma because it echoes a
message that is deeply ingrained in the social psyche. Third, racial and ethnic
stigmas reinforce insularity:
while stigma encourages the mainstream
population to avoid contact with the stigmatized group, it is only through
increased social contact between groups that racial and ethnic stereotypes can
be dispelled. Finally, the political powerlessness of many racial and ethnic
minorities makes the racial and ethnic stigma associated with behavioral
genetics research more likely to be translated into social policy. In the Genes
on Trial program, Francis Collins pointed out that men are “predisposed to get
in trouble with the law at about a tenfold increased risk than [women].”113 But
the fact that the Y chromosome is strongly correlated with crime is not touted
as a rationale to change social policy, perhaps in part because most
policymakers are men.
C. The Harms of Racial and Ethnic Stigma
The harms of racial and ethnic stigma come in various forms. At the
individual level, they include heightened anxiety about racial or ethnic bias,
self-hate, and stereotype threat. When an individual is stigmatized because of
her race or ethnicity, she may feel “insecure and uncertain in interactions with
others,” constantly fearing prejudice and discrimination.114 As a result, she may
distrust others and view all her social interactions through the lens of race or
ethnicity. At the same time, she may internalize the racial or ethnic stigma that
she faces every day.115 In Brown v. Board of Education, for example, the
Supreme Court recognized this form of self-stigma when it observed that
segregating schoolchildren by race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their

111. Cf. id. at 359 (describing the “black beast” stereotype as “a violent brute with an unusually
powerful sexual appetite for white women who was completely devoid of humanity”).
112. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002); see also GOFFMAN, supra note 102 at 73–
91, 102–04.
113. See GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1.
114. Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 839–41; see also GOFFMAN, supra note 102, at 13–14.
115. Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 841–42; see also GOFFMAN, supra note 102, at 7.
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status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
to ever be undone.”116 Finally, racial or ethnic stigma may create “stereotype
threat,” a type of performance anxiety that stems from the desire not to confirm
negative stereotypes about the racial or ethnic group.117
These psychological harms are not necessarily unique to race and ethnicity,
but they are more acute when membership in the stigmatized group is
important to the individual’s personal identity. For example, if being black is an
important aspect of one’s personal identity but being tall is not, then the
message that blacks are genetically predisposed to violence carries more
stigmatic harm than the message that tall people are genetically predisposed to
violence.
At the group level, the harms of racial and ethnic stigma include
discrimination, racial or ethnic profiling, and racial or ethnic stereotyping.118
Although these harms are also felt at the individual level, they are attacks on
the racial or ethnic community as a whole and represent the experiences of
many members of the group.119 The harm may be a tangible deprivation of
property or liberty, such as being denied a job or being stopped by the police, or
it may be an intangible deprivation of dignity, such as being called a racial
epithet or being asked whether one knows how to speak English. Like the
harms that affect the individual psyche, these harms draw their impact in part
from the group’s historical and collective experiences. Therefore, the stigmatic
harm of behavioral genetics research depends on both the context in which it is
conducted and the group on which it focuses.
VI
CONCLUSION
There is a certain risk here that [the study] could foment prejudice. And the risk arises
not just out of the study, but out of the way the study is presented. . . . And the bigger the
mess it is, and the [more] it’s about how the study was done, and the more confusing it
gets, there’s only one thing I remember. And that is that Tracy Islanders drink a lot. . . .
I’m committed to research, so I might do it anyway. But nonetheless, there’s a point
here.
120

— Justice Stephen Breyer, United States Supreme Court

In the Genes on Trial program, the hypothetical research on “the alcoholism
gene” in Tracy Islanders had no immediate clinical application.121 It did,

116. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
117. Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 843–44 (citing Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African-Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797 (1995)). For a review of the recent literature on stereotype threat, see S. Christian
Wheeler & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Stereotype Activation on Behavior: A Review of Possible
Mechanisms, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 797 (2001).
118. See Lenhardt, supra note 102, at 836–39.
119. See id. at 836.
120. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (playing the role of the uncle).
121. Id. (Francis Collins).
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however, have an immediate stigmatic impact on the Tracy Islander community.
In concluding the program, Charles Ogletree asked: “Should any of this
scientific inquiry be off limits?”122
For many scientists, this question is blasphemous, as they view all scientific
knowledge as inherently valuable, no matter what its social and political
consequences. Others point to the promise of improving the human condition
through scientific inquiry: “If we want to see a better day for medical
treatments, for public health, for improving our lot, for reducing suffering, it is
this engine of research that will get us there.”123 But even if behavioral genetics
research could theoretically lead to a “cure” for antisocial behavior, this benefit
is unlikely, whereas the harm of racial and ethnic stigma is all too likely, as our
history has shown.124 Moreover, although “curing” alcoholism is almost
certainly beneficial to the individual’s health and to society’s productivity, there
would be less consensus about other traits, such as homosexuality and
impulsiveness. Is the scientific ability to change these behaviors beneficial to
the individual or to society? Or is it a frightening move toward eugenics? In a
world of limited resources, should we fund research that has remote benefits
but obvious harms?
It is unlikely that the tide of behavioral genetics research can be, or even
should be, stopped. But in answering these questions, and in deciding who and
what to study, we must consider the implications of behavioral genetics research
for the individual, the family, the community, and society. We should question
not only the purpose of the study, but whether a strong scientific justification
supports focusing on a racial or ethnic minority group. We should consider who
is being studied, what is being studied, and who is doing the study. It is through
heightened sensitivity to the context of behavioral genetics research that we can
try to avoid the stigma of a “scarlet gene.”

122. Id. This same question was asked in 1992 when David Wasserman at the University of
Maryland planned a conference on “Genetic Factors in Crime: Findings, Uses, and Implications.” In
response to public protest and outcry from the African American community, the National Institutes of
Health revoked its funding, and the conference was canceled. See PETERS, supra note 57, at 72–73.
123. GENES ON TRIAL, supra note 1 (Francis Collins).
124. See Stevens, supra note 16, at 1070; cf. Rothenberg, supra note 30, at 106–07.

